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Quebec’s Economic and Commercial 




This article examines the ebb and flow of the Quebec government’s 
economic and commercial relations with the United States in the period 
1994–2017. The topic demonstrates the impact of three major forces 
on Quebec’s economic and commercial ties with the US: (1) the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which became operational 
in 1994 and was fully implemented over a 15-year period; (2) the 
onerous security policies put in place by the US government in the 
decade following the horrific events of 11 September 2001; and (3) 
changing economic circumstances in the United States ranging from 
robust growth to the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 
1930s. The article also indicates that the Quebec government continues 
to sponsor a wide range of activities in the United States, often more 
elaborate and extensive than comparable activities pursued by many 
nation-states with representation in the US.1
Quebec’s ‘foreign relations’
Quebec and its foreign relations occupy a rather unique position 
among academics who examine the international relations of sub-state 
governments, also widely referred to as paradiplomacy or constituent 
diplomacy.2 Since the beginning of the 1960s, Quebec has probably 
been the most activist non-central government in the world in terms 
of its international involvement. Although Taiwan, Catalonia and 
Flanders now spend more on their international programmes than 
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this Canadian province, Quebec has been involved for much longer 
on a continuous basis and has served as the model for many other 
non-central governments around the world as they have decided to 
venture forth into the international arena.3 In addition, the Quebec 
government’s publications on the province’s international relations are 
arguably the most thorough and sophisticated documents published 
by any non-central government. In particular, the Quebec Ministry of 
International Relations’ 2006 publication entitled Quebec’s International 
Policy: Working in Concert, which is over 100 pages long, should be 
required reading for every practitioner at the sub-state government 
level who acts in an international capacity.4 This lengthy report is to be 
updated in 2017, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the creation of 
the Quebec government’s Ministry of International Relations.
In the 2006 landmark report, the Quebec government identifies 
five major objectives of its international initiatives: (1) strengthening 
Quebec’s actions and influence; (2) fostering Quebec’s growth and 
prosperity; (3) contributing to the security of Quebec and the North 
American continent; (4) promoting the identity and culture of Quebec; 
and (5) contributing to the cause of international security.5 In order 
to fulfil these goals, the Quebec government currently maintains 28 
offices in 15 different countries, including, in order of importance, 
seven general delegations, four delegations, nine bureaus, six trade 
offices and two areas of representation in multilateral affairs.6 It has 
also entered into more than 700 agreements with about 80 national 
governments, international organizations and sub-state governments 
in federal systems and its representatives take part in scores of interna-
tional missions on an annual basis.7 The Ministère des Relations 
 internationales (MRI) was renamed in 2014 the Ministère des Relations 
internationales et de la Francophonie (MRIF) and MRIF coordinates 
most of the Quebec government’s international activities. Currently, 
MRIF has 433 employees, including 178 stationed abroad, and has an 
annual budget of $95 million.8
The Quebec government’s relations with the US states
Quebec’s territorial expanse covers over 1.5 million square kilometres 
and is almost three times larger than France is. Its GDP in 2015 was 
$381 billion and Quebec would have ranked that year as the 35th largest 
‘national’ economy in the world, larger than Malaysia’s and smaller 
than Hong Kong’s.9 Its population base in 2016 was 8.3 million, slightly 
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less than Virginia’s and Switzerland’s, ranking it 13th among the most 
populous states and provinces in the United States and Canada. However, 
its international outreach programmes compare more favourably with 
those of Switzerland than those of Virginia.
There are two main countries accorded priority status by the 
Quebec government, France and the United States. In the commercial 
and economic realms, however, the contest should not even be 
close, even after the EU–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) goes into effect. The United States is Quebec’s 
predominant partner in the trade, investment and tourism sectors. 
Furthermore, even though governments in Quebec have often been 
perceived in Washington, DC and the state capitals as left-of-centre, they 
have actually been among the staunchest supporters in Canada of open 
commercial relations with the United States. The Foreign Investment 
Review Act (FIRA) of 1974 supported by the federal government of 
Pierre Trudeau was intended to slow down foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in some Canadian economic sectors, with most of that investment 
emanating from the United States. The Parti Québécois (PQ) government 
in Quebec City later opposed Trudeau’s action and openly supported 
more US FDI within the province. Quebec governments were also a 
major force in pushing for the creation of the Canada–US Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) implemented in 1989, and NAFTA that superseded 
the FTA five years later. Former PQ premier Bernard Landry even voiced 
strong support for the establishment of a North American customs and 
monetary union utilizing the US dollar as its official currency.10
The Quebec government established its first office in the United 
States in New York City in 1940. It now maintains one general 
delegation in New York City, three delegations in Boston, Chicago and 
Los Angeles, one bureau in Washington, DC and three trade offices 
in Atlanta, Houston and Silicon Valley. These eight offices actually 
surpass the number of consulates in the US operated by national 
governments such as Australia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam and at least 70 
other nation-states.11
In 2010, the Quebec government released its strategic plan directed 
towards the United States.12 The plan consists of five major objectives: 
(1) contribute to the security of the North American continent; 
(2) promote economic exchanges; (3) ensure Quebec’s leadership in the 
areas of energy and the environment; (4) encourage the sharing and 
promotion of Quebec’s culture and identity; and (5) increase Quebec’s 
capacity to act and support the development of expertise.13 The Quebec 
offices in the United States work to: create more export opportunities 
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for their business community back home; entice American companies to 
make direct investments in the province; facilitate the efforts by Quebec 
enterprises to secure more US venture capital financing and enter into 
marketing and licensing arrangements with US firms; and convince 
Americans in general that Quebec is a great place to visit and spend 
their tourist dollars. Quebec’s representatives work directly with US 
state government officials and business executives, with each office 
given responsibility for specific geographic areas. Beyond the strictly 
economic and commercial functions, the delegations also promote 
political, cultural and educational objectives. For example, the Quebec 
delegation in Boston considers that its role in political affairs ‘is to foster 
and consolidate relations between the government of Quebec and the 
six New England States, by negotiating multi-sector agreements and 
conducting activities in fields of recognized importance such as energy, 
the environment, security and transportation’.14 The delegation’s official 
brochure emphasizes that ‘in the fields of culture, education and 
tourism, the Office strives to promote Quebec’s institutions and talents 
through a variety of events or exchanges with Quebec’s partners in 
Boston and throughout New England’.15
Using MRIF and its network of offices in the United States for 
logistical arrangements, Quebec’s premier will usually plan at least one 
official visit to the US annually, and other ministers will make numerous 
trips to make or renew the acquaintance of state officials and to 
participate in trade shows, conventions or specialized conferences. For 
example, Premier Philippe Couillard visited Washington, DC in February 
2016 and met with leaders of the Office of the US Trade Representative 
and the Environmental Protection Agency. He also spoke on climate 
change at the Resources for the Future organization and gave a speech 
at the Woodrow Wilson Center on trade and investment opportunities in 
his province. In total, the Premier and other cabinet members directed 
21 missions to the United States in 2015.16
Quebec is an official member of the US Council of State 
Governments and the National Conference of State Legislatures, and 
actually hosted the annual meeting of the former organization in 
Quebec City in 1999.17 It is also a leading player in the New England 
Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers organization, which held its 
40th annual meeting in Boston in August 2016, and is an active member 
of the Conference of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Governors and 
Premiers. In 2015, Quebec City hosted the Leadership Summit of this 
cross-border group. The Quebec government also co-founded in 2007 
the Southeastern United States–Canadian Provinces alliance involving 
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several Canadian provinces and the states of Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama.
In addition, Quebec’s representatives meet from time to time with 
the staff of the National Governors’ Association. Quebec also has a wide 
range of regional or bilateral arrangements with its neighbouring states, 
with the most high-profile being periodic Quebec–New York summits 
bringing together the premier and governor of these adjoining border 
jurisdictions. The Quebec Metropolitan Community hosted in June 
2012 delegates from the Great Lakes and St Lawrence Cities Initiative, 
bringing together scores of local officials from Canada and the United 
States. The Quebec government has been working closely with its 
counterpart in Ontario to expand the Quebec–Ontario trade corridor 
into the United States. Currently, the Quebec government has a special 
arrangement with California to promote a cross-border system for the 
trading of carbon permits, with the goal of reducing harmful emissions 
into the atmosphere.18
Among all the sub-state governments in the world, Quebec has 
the deepest and most expansive ties to US state-level executive and 
legislative branches.
NAFTA, post-9/11 US security policies and US economic 
travails
Generally, a quarter of a century of free trade, dating back to the 
FTA implemented in 1989, has been very good for Canada, Quebec 
and the United States. Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) at the 
end of 2015 was $2 trillion, ranking it as the tenth largest economy 
in the world measured in nominal US dollars. This is a remarkable 
achievement because each of the nine nations ahead of Canada has a 
much larger population base, with Canada’s 37 million people ranking 
them as the 38th most populous country in the world. Canada’s 
economic growth rate over the past several years has been near the 
top of the major Western countries, although with the recent drop in 
commodity prices, economic growth in this resource-dependent nation 
has sagged a bit.
Canada–US free trade has been beneficial to consumers in both 
countries who now have a better selection of products at prices that 
are more competitive. Companies have also been able to abandon their 
branch-plant tactics in favour of global and regional ‘value chains’.19 
Trade between the two neighbouring countries has gone beyond 
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‘international’ to the level of ‘integrative’, with more than two-thirds of 
cross-border trade taking place either between units of the same company 
or among parties associated with an integrated network of firms.20 In 
addition, one-third of the value of Canada’s total exports is composed of 
previously imported inputs, another sign of integrative trade.21 Ideally, 
integrative trade means that North American companies, adopting ‘just-
in-time’ and other supply-chain strategies that flourish in a regional 
free-trade setting, are better prepared to cope with competition from 
their counterparts in Europe, Asia and elsewhere in the world.
Yet, without any doubt, the achievements attributable to the FTA, 
NAFTA and continental economic growth have been marred by two 
momentous events: post-9/11 US security policies and the lingering 
effects of the major US recession from December 2007 to June 2009.
On 10 September 2001, NAFTA had been in effect for more than 
seven years. Canada had 30 million people and its 2001 GDP was 
$1.1 trillion. The United States had 285 million people and its GDP 
for the full year was $10.2 trillion. Annual trade in goods between the 
countries in 2000 was valued at $410 billion. On the day before 9/11, 
the Canadian dollar, often referred to as the loonie, traded at about 64 
US cents. The 49th parallel separating the two neighbours had long 
been considered as the world’s longest undefended border. Neither 
Americans nor Canadians needed passports to visit one another’s 
country. In some rural border checkpoints, officials went home at night 
and would place orange cones in the road to let travellers know that 
they were crossing from one country to the other.
Now fast forward to the tenth anniversary of the events of 
9/11. Canada had a population base of 34 million and the United 
States 312 million. Canadian GDP in 2010 had reached $1.6 trillion 
and the US GDP $14.5 trillion. The loonie was worth 1.02 versus the 
US greenback. Two-way trade in goods recovered significantly from 
a huge plunge in 2009 and equalled $526 billion for calendar year 
2010. However, when measured in Canadian dollars, exports from 
Canada were actually $50 billion lower than in 2001. The US share of 
total Canadian exports had also dropped from 87 per cent in 2000 to 
75 per cent in 2010.
The number of Americans visiting Canada by car in June 2009 
was at the lowest level since 1972, even though the US population had 
grown by 100 million people during that period. Today, as a result of 
new passport regulations, 59 per cent of Americans cannot even visit 
Canada because they have failed to procure passports or, in limited 
cases, enhanced driver’s licences which are mandatory in order to 
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re-enter the US.22 In 2015, there were 20.7 million trips by Canadians 
to the United States, versus only 12.5 million trips by Americans to 
Canada, even though the United States has almost nine times more 
people than Canada has.23 In comparison, Americans made 15.6 million 
trips to Canada in 2001, illustrating a lost decade and a half in terms 
of US visitors to their closest neighbour to the north.24 Furthermore, 
Canadian direct investment in the United States is currently only 
slightly smaller than US direct investment in Canada, in spite of the fact 
that the US economy is 11 times larger than the Canadian economy, 
measured in nominal US dollars.25
What happened between 11 September 2001 and 11 September 
2011? In simple terms, Washington overreacted to the horrific events 
of 9/11 and ‘thickened’ the common border with Canada beyond any 
reasonable parameters.26 Ironically, in spite of all the money spent on 
this thickening process, a December 2010 US Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report lamented that such a small section of the border 
had actually been ‘secured’ a decade after 9/11. The report concluded 
that only 1,007 miles of the nearly 4,000-mile common border had ‘full 
situational awareness’ by US authorities and only 32 miles were at ‘an 
acceptable level of control’, even though three Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) components, Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the US Coast Guard 
had expended $2.9 billion in 2010 alone attempting to secure the 
border from external threats.27
Arguably, no major nation in the world is as dependent for its 
economic well-being on another nation as Canada is dependent on 
open access to the vast US marketplace. Presently, Canada’s exports 
of goods and services to the United States, US companies with direct 
investments in Canada and Americans visiting Canada for business, 
convention, education and tourism purposes, account for at least a 
quarter of Canada’s annual GDP and more than two million Canadian 
jobs.28 Furthermore, this economic dependency has occurred at a time 
when the US share of Canadian exports, the US share of the stock of 
FDI in Canada and the US share of foreigners visiting Canada, have all 
declined since 9/11.
Quebec has not been spared from the problems of the past decade 
and a half. In the year 2000, 86 per cent of Quebec’s total exports 
went to the United States, compared with only 72 per cent in 2015.29 
Exporting is critical to the Quebec economy, accounting for more than 
600,000 direct and indirect jobs.30 Some of these jobs have been lost 
because between 2000 and 2011, Quebec’s exports to the United States 
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fell by $20 billion. As recently as 2008, Quebec would have ranked 
as the sixth largest ‘national’ exporter to the US, ahead of the United 
Kingdom and South Korea. However, Quebec slipped to eighth among 
‘national’ exporters in 2015, with about the same level as exports from 
France. Quebec also receives a relatively small share of its total imports 
from the US, with American companies accounting for only 38 per cent 
of Quebec’s imports of goods in 2015.31
As is the case with most other provinces, Quebec has also been 
hurt by the slowing pace of US FDI in Canada through much of this 
period. In 1993, US direct investment accounted for 65 per cent of the 
total stock of FDI in Canada, a share that dropped to 50 per cent in 
2015.32 In proportional terms using nominal Canadian dollars, US FDI 
in Canada increased by 358 per cent between 1993 and 2011, whereas 
investment from the rest of the world into Canada increased by 562 per 
cent. As a Library of Parliament study concluded, ‘the United States is 
falling in importance as an investment partner for Canada’.33
It is very difficult to gather substantive data on the stock of FDI in 
Quebec relative to other Canadian provinces. However, one can surmise 
that US and total FDI stock in Quebec is below Quebec’s percentage of 
the Canadian population (23 per cent) and Canada’s total GDP (19 per 
cent). For example, the Task Force on Business Investment in Quebec 
has estimated that foreign-based multinational corporations account for 
only 13 per cent of all private-sector jobs in Quebec versus 20 per cent 
or more in several other provinces.34
Why is US direct investment relatively low in Quebec? In part, 
this may be attributable to Canadian government restrictions on 
certain types of FDI, with total restrictions ranking relatively high 
among OECD member states.35 In addition, Quebec’s extensive network 
of state-owned firms and special French-language regulations may 
dissuade some small and medium-sized US companies from investing 
in Quebec.
Quebec has also suffered from the drop in American tourists 
visiting the province. The province has been an especially tough sale for 
foreign visitors in spite of its well-developed tourism infrastructure and 
attractive cities, particularly Montreal and Quebec City. In 2008, Quebec 
accounted for only 12.4 per cent of all international visitors to Canada 
and 17.3 per cent of total spending by these visitors, both well below 
its share of Canada’s population and GDP.36 In 2014, Americans made 
2.5 million trips to Quebec and they spent $1.3 billion.37 In comparison, 
1.4 million visitors from other countries came to Quebec and their 
spending of $1.4 billion was higher than the combined spending of the 
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more numerous Americans.38 Moreover, Quebec was the destination 
for far fewer US travellers in 2014 than neighbouring Ontario.39 As a 
whole, Americans know very little about tourism opportunities within 
the province of Quebec.
Policy considerations for Quebec
Both the Liberal and PQ governments in Quebec have been generally 
supportive of the international programmes whether the provincial 
economy was doing well or in the doldrums, but Lucien Bouchard’s PQ 
government from 1996 to 2001 slashed MRI’s budget and temporarily 
closed the offices in Boston, Chicago, Atlanta and Los Angeles, along 
with others around the world. This decision was quite drastic, but not 
nearly as draconian as the one made in 2003 by California’s Assembly 
and Senate, supported by Governor Gray Davis, to close permanently 
the state’s dozen trade offices abroad and disband the state’s Technology, 
Trade and Commerce Agency. Even today, California, which ranks as the 
world’s fifth largest national economy in nominal US dollars, has only 
one office abroad and it is paid for by the privately funded Bay Area 
Council.40
Quebec’s international budget was eventually restored, but under 
the current Liberal government of Philippe Couillard, staffing at 
MRIF has been reduced and cuts made in some fringe benefits for 
employees and certain support services abroad.41 Over the past eight 
years, the number of employees at MRIF has declined by 144 positions 
to the current level of 433. Nevertheless, the number of employees 
and annual spending are still far higher than what other provincial 
governments spend on their international programmes. Compared 
to the US states, MRIF’s spending is only slightly less than spending 
by all 50 states combined on international programmes, exclusive 
of incentives offered to foreign investors, and MRIF’s employment is 




The 2006 International Policy report indicates that the United States is 
a major priority for Quebec. This is spelt out in priority two, strength-
ening and increasing economic exchanges with the United States and 
Europe, and in priority three, contributing to the security of the North 
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American continent. Since the report was released, the government has 
increased its resources devoted to the United States through upgrading 
its US offices.43
However, Quebec continues to station almost as many personnel 
in its Paris office as in all of its offices combined in the United 
States. There is no doubt that the French connection is special to 
francophone Quebecers and these liaisons should remain strong. 
After all, the French government has accorded Quebec’s general 
delegation in Paris almost the same status as an embassy. French 
executive leaders, presidents and prime ministers have often visited 
Quebec every other year, with Quebec’s premier visiting Paris in the 
intervening years.
France is also important to many Quebecers because some previous 
French governments have stated that they would act positively if 
Quebec voters ever opted to support sovereignty in a future referendum. 
Aside from this contentious issue, France remains important because 
it represents the gateway for Quebec enterprises to gain access to 
the 28 nations and half a billion consumers which now constitute the 
European Union.
However, neither France nor any other country is in the same 
orbit as the United States in terms of its influence on the present 
and future economic well-being of Quebecers. Even more precisely, 
Quebec’s economic connections to the United States are now much 
more significant than even its economic linkages to the rest of Canada. 
To paraphrase Andrew Cohen, Quebec’s foreign trade ‘isn’t so foreign. 
It is American’.44
Quebec’s political leadership cannot afford to underestimate 
the United States’s economic importance. The provincial government 
should give top priority in the allocation of money and personnel to its 
activities in the United States, even if this means downsizing some of 
its existing programmes elsewhere in the world, as well as its nascent 
activities vis-à-vis international organizations such as UNESCO.
If Brexit occurs by 2019, the US economy will be larger than 
the European Union’s, even though the EU population will be about 
445 million in comparison to 335 million in the US. Quebec will remain 
right next door to the world’s largest national economy, measured in 
nominal US dollars. In 2015, two US states would have ranked among 
the world’s ten largest countries in GDP, 13 states among the top 25 
countries, 28 states among the top 50 countries, 43 among the top 
75 and all 50 states among the top 98 countries.45 With respect to 
this large market to its south, Quebec’s exports of goods in 2015 
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represented almost 22 per cent of its provincial GDP, with 72 per cent 
of these exports destined for the American states. Furthermore, the vast 
majority of potential customers for Quebec’s goods and services living 
within 1,000 kilometres of the province are located in the United States, 
not Canada. With this in mind, Quebec officials must concentrate on 
economic and commercial ties at the state level in the United States and 
make the best of what has been a rather turbulent period over the past 




MRIF has a global perspective and its officers need a great variety of 
geographical and functional expertise. However, a significant core of 
these officers who will either be permanently staffed within MRIF’s 
headquarters or be a part of the provincial foreign service should devote 
a sizeable part of their careers to Quebec’s relations with the United 
States.
Quebec’s foreign service is arguably the best trained and most 
professional of any comparable sub-state government in the world, 
and it even compares favourably with many national foreign services.46 
Quebec has largely avoided the patronage and cronyism that has 
afflicted some other provincial and state international programmes 
over the past several decades. In addition, the continuity of its 
international programmes since the mid-1960s has resulted in the 
development of a foreign service corps with decades of experience. A 
problem facing MRIF, however, is helping its foreign service officers to 
make a successful transition from serving abroad to rotating back to 
headquarters in Quebec City. When they are abroad, these officers have 
numerous responsibilities and are provided with generous housing 
and very nice offices. In contrast, when they return to Quebec City on 
rotation, they are often assigned a cubicle and their list of responsi-
bilities is reduced substantially. This is not a unique situation because 
the US Department of State and Global Affairs Canada face similar 
challenges with their much larger number of returning foreign service 
officers.
This problem of rotation can be solved, at least in terms of those 
in Quebec’s foreign service who devote most of their careers to the 
United States. Whether stationed in Quebec City or Montreal, these 
officers would continue on a daily basis to monitor developments in 
the United States on both a regional and functional basis. They would 
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interact regularly with their contacts in the United States via phone or 
the Internet and they would travel to the US whenever needed, in strict 
coordination with the delegations in the US that have responsibility for 
the area where the officer will be visiting. Assignments in the United 
States should be for three to four years, followed by an assignment in 
another part of the United States and then two years back in Quebec. 
Perhaps two assignments during the foreign service officer’s career 
would be to another part of the Americas or other countries, just to 
provide greater variety and a sense of excitement. Nevertheless, the 
officer would be a US specialist and would devote the preponderance 
of his or her career to Quebec–US relations. Optimally, this speciali-
zation will improve the Quebec government’s ability to influence 
favourably US state and local government representatives and others 
from civil society and the private sector.
(3)  Quebec Should Optimize the Location of Its US Offices and the 
Utilization of Its Staff
The Quebec government currently maintains offices in New York City, 
Boston, Washington, DC, Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, Los Angeles 
and Silicon Valley. The New York City general delegation, located in 
Rockefeller Center, is far larger than any of the other offices. All of 
Quebec’s facilities in the United States are situated in prime locations 
within major cities and are generally close to the targeted decision-
makers Quebec’s diplomats need to meet. However, the New York 
City, Washington, DC, Chicago and Los Angeles offices do face some 
special challenges. Without any doubt, New York City ranks as one of 
the world’s most eminent cities, as the financial centre for the United 
States and as the prime location for corporate America. Quebec needs 
a major presence in the New York City metropolitan area that has 
a GDP not much smaller than Canada’s, at current exchange rates. 
Nonetheless, in terms of political decision-making that might affect 
Quebec’s economic activities in the United States, the locus of power 
is in Albany, not New York City. The same challenge faces the Chicago 
and Los Angeles offices. Chicago is the economic dynamo of Illinois, 
but the state government is situated in Springfield, not Chicago. The 
five-county Los Angeles metropolitan area would rank as one of the 
top 20 national economies in the world, and Quebec representatives 
need to be there. On the other hand, political decisions are rendered 
hundreds of miles away in Sacramento.
The Washington bureau has assumed almost a sui generis status. 
For many years, Ottawa asked all of the provincial governments to 
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refrain from opening offices in Washington and to rely instead on 
services provided by the Canadian Embassy. Ottawa also offered 
to allot space for provincial representatives within the Embassy 
and Alberta has done so since 2004. Previous Quebec governments 
decided that they needed a direct and independent presence in 
Washington and opened what was originally referred to as a tourism 
office as an appendage of the New York City general delegation. The 
tourism function was strictly a facade as Quebec representatives were 
there to follow what was going on in the nation’s capital and to act 
as lobbyists vis-à-vis the federal government. This office has been 
upgraded and expanded, but the reasons for doing so are question-
able. One reason for expansion is to allow Quebec to monitor the 
activities of international organizations such as the World Bank. This 
rationale is consistent with the 2006 International Policy document 
that emphasizes that Quebec wants to develop a direct role in interna-
tional organizations that deal with issues falling under provincial juris-
diction. Quebec has now achieved a permanent status in the Canadian 
delegation to UNESCO and is actively engaged in the Organisation 
internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Frankly, this new emphasis 
on an enhanced Quebec presence in IOs, especially using Washington 
as a location for doing so, will yield modest results and is a drain on 
MRIF’s scarce resources.
The second rationale for expanding the staff in Washington is 
to keep better track of issues at the White House and on Capitol Hill, 
and to lobby for policies that will benefit the interests of Quebec. On 
the surface, this is a reasonable pursuit, but in reality it is another 
money burner. State governments across the United States lament 
that they are treated as any other interest group when it comes to 
lobbying Congress or the executive branch in Washington. They are 
extremely frustrated by the lack of attention that is given to federal 
issues in general and to issues of particular concern to individual 
states.47 If the state governments consider that they are hamstrung 
in their relations with the federal apparatus, why would the Quebec 
government fare any better? The best strategy for Quebec to follow 
is coalition building at the state level. Moreover, Quebec should rely 
on the Canadian Embassy to keep track of issues of major concern 
to the province. After all, the 260-member staff at the Canadian 
Embassy dwarfs the personnel assigned to all of Quebec’s US offices 
combined.48 In spite of recent cutbacks, Ottawa continues to operate 
15 consulates or trade offices across the country, second only to 
Mexico’s 50 consulates. The Quebec government could certainly decide 
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to keep an office open in Washington, DC, but the expansion of the staff 
to carry out functions linked to IOs and the US federal government is 
ill-advised.
There is much work to be done in the major cities where Quebec 
offices are opened in the United States, and staff bases outside of New 
York City are quite small. This results in a tendency to stay within the 
major metropolitan areas where the offices are situated and not venture 
out to other regions that are within the coverage area of each delegation. 
For example, the Pennsylvania state government has in recent years 
maintained the largest and most ambitious international programme 
among the 50 state governments, and Pennsylvania alone would 
have ranked as the world’s 19th largest national economy in 2015.49 
Should more effort be given to interacting with public- and private-
sector representatives in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, and 
somewhat less to similar groups in the ultra- competitive, topsy-turvy 
world of New York City? Would better results be attained in terms of 
Quebec’s economic and commercial interests? Similar examples can 
be given for each of Quebec’s delegations in the United States because 
so much of America’s economic dynamism and diversity is to be found 
in metropolitan regions spread throughout the country and not just 
in a few select cities or states. The ability to tap into this dynamism 
and diversity is yet another reason for each delegation to work 




Once again, no major nation in the world is as dependent for its 
economic well-being on another nation as Canada is on the United 
States for export markets, inward direct investment and tourists, even 
though this dependency has definitely slackened since the beginning 
of the new century. In essence, both Canada’s and Quebec’s economic 
orientation since the implementation of the FTA and NAFTA has been 
reoriented away from an east–west axis and towards a north–south axis 
with at least nine of the ten provinces now exporting more to the United 
States than to other parts of Canada.
The Quebec government has a series of priorities in terms of 
its economic and commercial interests with the United States. It 
supports the development of a seamless border at the 49th parallel 
that would allow goods and people to cross with minimum disruption. 
It would like its natural resources and energy sources such as lumber 
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and hydropower to enter the United States without any impediments. 
It would like to attract private investment and new technological 
innovations from the United States in order to expand and modernize 
the province’s infrastructure and business sector. It would like more 
Americans to spend their tourist dollars in Quebec rather than in other 
foreign destinations, and would appreciate Washington not imposing 
rigorous passport and identification requirements that might dissuade 
Americans from leaving their country. It would also like to sustain 
robust economic expansion while at the same time producing a cleaner 
environment.
The most effective lobbying strategy for Quebec is to align 
and coalesce with powerful US public- and private-sector interest 
groups that share Quebec’s position on specific issues. Quebec’s 
representatives in the US should be able to identify potential allies in 
state and municipal governments, non-governmental organizations, 
academia and the business community, and then proceed to push for 
changes in federal, state and municipal government policies that will 
be advantageous to Quebecers. US elected officials have tradition-
ally shown little concern for foreign governments which lobby for 
changes in laws and regulations, but they are always concerned about 
domestic groups that might affect their chances of being re-elected in 
the future.
(5)  More Attention Should Be Accorded to the Border Region
A major cross-border region in Canada and the United States consists 
of Quebec, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine.50 This is 
one of the regions where North American economic integration ‘is the 
most intense and dynamic’.51 For example, exports to New York alone 
represented in 2013 almost 10 per cent of Quebec’s total exports to 
the world.52 Approximately 180 Canadian-based companies, mostly 
from Quebec, have also established a business presence in New York’s 
Clinton County which is next to the border and within an hour’s drive 
of Montreal.53
On the other hand, the border is infringing upon the development 
of even closer regional economic integration. Montreal is about 
equidistant from New York City and Toronto, but Quebec’s trade 
volume with neighbouring Ontario is four times higher than with 
neighbouring New York state, even though New York has a much larger 
population and GDP than Ontario has.54 The periodic Quebec–New 
York summits bringing together the premier and governor should be 
continued, with more emphasis on substantive agreements and less on 
 QUEbEC’S ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL L INkAgES  57
public relations. Regular discussions should continue with leaders of 
other border states and all should be working to improve the transpor-
tation infrastructure on both sides of the common border. Energy and 
environmental issues are also of critical concern to the border states 
and Quebec has the potential of shipping much more hydroelectricity 
to this region.
In terms of the New England states within close proximity to 
Quebec, past bilateral discussions have often involved big teams from 
Quebec and relatively small teams from the individual states. Perhaps 
the Quebec government could be a little more circumspect in putting 
together the negotiating teams and pare the number of participants 
so that both teams are roughly equal. Some of those on the US side 
who have taken part in past discussions with Quebec have frequently 
mentioned how big the Quebec teams are, how many resources seem 
to be at the disposal of the Quebec team and how well prepared the 
Quebec team is on technical issues. These comments were intended to 
be positive, but some felt that the disproportionate size of the teams was 
also somewhat intimidating.55
(6)  Fine Tune Executive and Legislative Diplomacy at the State Level
Because MRIF has sent representatives to the United States for decades, 
it has experienced the highs and lows of cultivating good relations with 
certain state officials, only to find these relations deteriorating substan-
tially with a change in executive or even legislative leadership at the 
state level. The problem is exacerbated by having such a high turnover 
in the staffing of state offices that deal with international issues. Unlike 
Quebec, many administrators dealing with international economic 
issues at the state level have relatively short tenures, meaning that there 
is a lack of institutional continuity as the transition is made from one 
governorship to the next.
Quebec’s diplomats in the United States cannot be discouraged 
by this phenomenon, but there are certain things that can assist 
them to mitigate the continuity gap. As usual, the first step is to 
develop personal relationships with top elected officials and civil 
servants within the state. Governorships generally last from four to 
eight years and this provides ample time to instruct them about what 
Quebec has to offer. The second step is to make the acquaintance of 
legislative leaders from both major political parties. Their tenure in 
the state legislatures is often much longer than that of the governor, 
lieutenant-governor or the secretary of state. The third step is to 
cultivate friendships with top-tier civil service executives who may not 
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be directly involved in the volatile international relations sector, but 
do have some overlapping interests. It is much more likely that these 
bureaucratic officials will retain their positions in state government 
over a longer time period than those who have to grapple with the 
day-to-day uncertainties of the state’s international programmes. 
The fourth step is to interact with leaders of civic organizations, local 
chambers of commerce and individual corporations who have a vested 
interest in nurturing better ties with their Quebec counterparts. These 
representatives of the private sector also help to ease the painful 
transition that frequently occurs when a governor and his or her closest 
advisers exit office.
Furthermore, Quebec’s representatives should encourage state 
executive, legislative, civic and business leaders to visit Montreal 
and perhaps even Quebec City. Such visits tend to be very positive 
experiences and reinforce both friendships and the perception that 
Quebec can be a significant economic partner. Costs for such visits are 
relatively low, especially for those travelling from the border states 
that should be MRIF’s major priority. However, influential decision-
makers from around the United States should also be invited to visit 
the province. Most Americans know very little about Quebec, and 
the knowledge level seems to deteriorate as the distance from the 
border increases. With this in mind, both public- and private-sector 
leaders from California, for example, who deal with high-tech and 
entertainment issues, would probably have a pleasant eye-opening 
experience by visiting the centres of excellence and multimedia 
facilities in Montreal.
(7)  Refine Export Strategies
The Canadian dollar value of Quebec’s exports to the United States 
has been relatively stagnant over the past several years. The built-in 
advantages Quebec has enjoyed under NAFTA have been eroded 
somewhat because Washington has thickened the border with a labyrinth 
of new security measures. In addition, the US federal government 
has entered into a series of free-trade agreements with several other 
countries or groups of nations, watering down some of the advantages 
previously offered by NAFTA membership.
Working in collaboration with its business and labour sectors, the 
Quebec government needs to identify those goods and services that 
have the best chance of capturing larger market shares in the United 
States, with emphasis placed on value-added production. This does not 
mean that special subsidies should be given to these sectors, but rather 
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Quebec’s representatives in the United States would highlight them as 
they meet with their US contacts.
Quebec also needs to push strenuously for an upsurge in 
electricity exports to the United States. Hydroelectricity is Quebec’s 
leading comparative advantage in North America as it ranks fourth 
in the world in the production of such energy.56 Hydro-Québec is 
also a world leader in this field. Without too much effort, infrastruc-
ture improvements can be made on the US side of the border that 
would route electricity from Quebec as far south as Florida.57 The 
province is also capable of generating much more electricity from 
the James Bay region. This should be a leading priority, although 
any new expansion must have the agreement of the Cree and abide 
by rigid  environmental standards in terms of dam construction and 
the location of transmission lines. With growing public concern over 
the negative effects of greenhouse gases and accelerating demand 
in the United States for renewal energy sources, Quebec’s hydroelectric 
production should be a major export winner over the next couple of 
decades.
Quebec’s exports to the United States can be boosted by 
utilizing short-lane shipping routes along the St Lawrence Seaway 
more effectively.58 For the moment, the St Lawrence Seaway–Great 
Lakes Corridor shipping lanes are working at only modest capacity. 
Waterborne shipments can carry heavy cargoes and emit only a fraction 
of the pollution of cross-border trucking. Such shipping can also avoid 
the long lines at border inspection stations. Because of Quebec’s 
strategic location along the St Lawrence River, any increases in 
waterborne shipments should be especially advantageous to companies 
located within the province that cater to consumers in the United 
States.
(8)  Intensify the Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment
The Quebec government should not be reticent about seeking FDI from 
the United States. The lion’s share of FDI is in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions, with only a small percentage in the form of ‘greenfield’ 
investments such as building an auto assembly plant from scratch. Many 
Quebecers have become suspicious of such activities, especially with 
so much publicity given to the foreign acquisitions of such well-known 
companies as Hudson’s Bay, Inco and Dofasco.59 However, the Quebec 
government should resist the temptation to limit inward FDI because 
the province already lags behind Ontario in attracting investment from 
south of the border. In addition, it will need both robust foreign and 
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domestic investment to modernize and expand the Quebec economy 
in an era of growing globalization and interdependence. Neither can 
Canada as a whole be complacent about the direct investment issue, 
because its share of inward FDI destined for North America has declined 
significantly since 1980.60
Investissement Québec, the unit of the Quebec government that 
works to attract inward FDI from around the world, should intensify 
its efforts in the United States in a campaign to attract investments in 
targeted economic sectors. This is not an easy task, because American 
investors, as sophisticated as they might be on economic and financial 
issues, generally know very little about Quebec. Moreover, they often 
perceive Quebec, in comparison with other Canadian provinces, as 
presenting a special set of challenges linked to the predominance 
of the French language, the legacy of the separatist movement, 
the significant state role in the economic sector and the provincial 
government’s very sizeable debt burden. Executives of small and 
medium-sized US companies, in particular, will also have to be 
convinced of the viability of establishing or acquiring enterprises 
within Quebec versus simply exporting their production into the 
province and taking advantage of the free-trade conditions put in place 
under NAFTA.
The Quebec strategy at the individual US state level should include 
the following: (1) identify companies which already export to Quebec 
or have entered into joint arrangements with Quebec enterprises 
and discuss the benefits of FDI in terms of establishing or acquiring 
production units having global or regional product mandates; (2) target 
companies in certain sectors where Quebec has a relative comparative 
advantage, including heavy energy users, those needing access to raw 
materials and those needing well-educated and multilingual workers 
in multimedia, pharma ceutical, hydro, aircraft production and other 
sectors where Quebec currently excels; (3) emphasize the advantages 
of both Canada’s and Quebec’s targeted immigration policies that will 
allow companies to import foreign talent much more easily than under 
the ponderous and somewhat xenophobic programme now being 
pursued by the US federal government61 and (4) constantly trumpet 
the healthcare advantages in Quebec both in terms of the quality of 
medical treatment and the competitive business advantages for corpo-
rations which might be able to cut in half their healthcare expenses 
by shifting units into Quebec. The attraction of FDI must be a major 
priority of the Quebec government because of the very close linkage in 
North America between such investment and trade flows, with a major 
 QUEbEC’S ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL L INkAgES  61
portion of all trade in goods across the 49th parallel occurring between 
a parent company and its affiliates. Unlike most of its fellow provinces 
or even sub-state units in other countries around the world, Quebec 
has its established network of offices opened in the United States that 
permits it to facilitate FDI attraction on a state-by-state basis and to 
use existing government and business contacts to identify potential 
foreign investors.
(9)  Re-energize Tourism Promotion
Tourism officials in Canada have always faced an uphill battle in 
convincing Americans of the ‘urgency’ of visiting their northern 
neighbour. Canadian tourism experts even suggest that some Americans 
perceive Canada as being a somewhat dull tourist destination.62
Quebec’s representatives in the United States first have to 
dissipate stereotypes about ‘Frenchness’ and separatism and make 
Quebec’s distinctiveness a positive selling point. Because of the French 
language and Québécois culture, Quebec has an allure that other parts 
of Canada do not have. For some Americans, having to navigate in 
another language might be a deterrent, but millions travel to Mexico 
each year and the Spanish language does not keep them away. The 
problem is that Quebec is not identified with the sunshine, warm 
temperatures and beaches of Mexico. On the other hand, Quebec 
has safe cities with cultural and sporting choices ranging from good 
museums to jazz festivals to excellent skiing and Formula 1 motor 
racing. Quebec City, with its unique walled fortress and revival of 
its old neighbourhoods adjacent to the St Lawrence River, is one 
of a select number of  municipalities designated by UNESCO as a 
‘world heritage site’. Montreal also has a European-style sophistica-
tion without having to cross the Atlantic and deal with the European 
continent’s prohibitive prices. The recent renovation of ‘Vieux-Montreal’ 
along the port area has also added immeasurably to the appeal of the 
city. Without any doubt, the eventual introduction of European-style 
high-speed rail links between Montreal and New York City, and perhaps 
even Boston, would provide a long-term boost to Quebec’s tourism 
prospects.
Quebecers are justifiably proud of their cultural roots. Those 
representing Quebec in the United States can also trumpet the 
cultural richness of modern-day Quebec, ranging from Céline Dion 
to Cirque du Soleil to Denys Arcand. Too many forget that tourism 
is one of the greatest generators of jobs and income in modern 
societies. Furthermore, some visitors like what they see so much 
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that they want to return on a regular basis, make investments in 
the local economy or expand their own business contacts with 
local enterprises. In this respect, tourism and cultural promotion 
represent important economic development strategies for the province 
of Quebec.
(10)  Target the United States as a Source of Immigrants
Quebec’s share of Canada’s population continues to fall and its birth 
rate for most of the past two decades has been well below replacement 
levels. The Canadian House of Commons is expanding its membership 
but none of the new seats will go to Quebec. One million people moved 
out of the province between 1976 and 2000 because of a combination 
of the fear of the sovereignty movement, tighter restrictions on the use 
of languages other than French in the educational system and business 
community and attractive economic opportunities available in other 
parts of Canada.63
In order to maintain or increase its population base and retain its 
economic competitiveness, Quebec must attract a significant number of 
skilled immigrants from abroad. The Quebec government has the final 
say on whether to accept or deny entry to the province to independent 
immigrants who are not coming for family reunification purposes, and 
it has imposed a strict test favouring those who already speak French 
or formally commit themselves to learn French on their arrival in the 
province. This policy, although strongly supported by the francophone 
population, undoubtedly diminishes the chances of attracting skilled 
immigrants from Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and other parts of the 
world.
From a strictly economic and demographic perspective, Quebec’s 
immigration policy is short-sighted and counterproductive. In a regional 
and international environment that is becoming progressively more 
competitive, and in view of the very low provincial birth rate, Quebec 
desperately needs to attract well-educated and skilled immigrants. 
Furthermore, how these immigrants are treated once they settle in 
Quebec will determine whether the best and brightest of them establish 
long-term roots in the province or simply decide to move to other parts 
of Canada.
Quebec can use its extensive network at the US state level to 
encourage queries from US residents who might be tempted to move 
northward. In particular, short-sighted US visa policies, including 
severe limitations on the H1-B visa rules for highly skilled immigrants, 
may prompt skilled foreign nationals presently in the US to relocate 
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to Quebec. The same situation may also be applicable to foreign 
graduate students enrolled in US institutions of higher learning who are 
required to leave the United States upon graduation. In view of several 
controversial immigration policies now being considered by the Trump 
administration, Quebec might find it easier to entice US residents to 
the province than at any other period over the past several decades. 
Once again, Quebec’s comparative advantage in doing so is that it has 
the largest contingent of personnel stationed in the United States who 
can work on attracting immigrants, especially to the very vibrant and 
cosmopolitan Montreal urban region. However, it does bear the burden 
of a disadvantage compared to other provinces, and that is its rather 
rigid immigration regulations linked to the use of the French language 
by immigrants and their families.
Concluding observations
The Quebec–US economic and commercial relationship has had its 
share of upturns and downturns in the period between 1994 and 
2017, and President Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy and pledge to 
renegotiate or even terminate NAFTA may further exacerbate cross-
border difficulties.
The FTA and NAFTA helped to solidify cross-border cooperation 
and major gains in trade, investment and tourism activity were 
achieved for most of the first decade after NAFTA was implemented. 
Unfortunately, 11 September 2001 represented a watershed in 
the bilateral relationship and the thickening of the border and 
Washington’s propensity to place security before trade have combined 
to slow down the  cross-border economic gains achieved earlier. 
Post-9/11 US policies also contributed to the American economic 
malaise over much of the past decade as budget deficits swelled and 
more money was funnelled into defence, intelligence and security 
operations and less into infrastructure modernization and other 
programmes that would have enhanced America’s global economic 
competitiveness.64
In addition, relatively slow US economic growth since 2001 has 
had a negative effect on Quebec’s exports to the United States and US 
FDI within the province. However, if the United States can maintain its 
recent GDP growth spurt and robust job creation, and not turn inward 
under the current US administration, economic linkages with Quebec 
may once again flourish.
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Finally, the Quebec government should do a thorough assessment 
of its ‘diplomacy’ in the United States. During the period 1994–2017, 
how well have its US offices performed, how effective have been its 
various missions to the US and how productive has been its overall 
strategy towards the United States? How do government expenditures 
related to MRIF’s US programme stack up against Quebec’s overall 
economic and commercial performance vis-à-vis the United States over 
the past two decades? Using solid metrics and performance standards, 
this thorough review would help determine whether a course correction 
is needed in the Quebec government’s economic and commercial policy 
towards the US, and pinpoint what facets of the programme need to be 
strengthened or de-emphasized.
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